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IV

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Antonio Coronado asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress.
An officer pulled up behind Mr. Coronado with his emergency lights and flashers activated,
while Mr. Coronado was parked on a residential street. During the encounter, the officer saw
Mr. Coronado move an empty beer can, and the officer began an investigation for DUI. The
district court denied the motion to suppress evidence, finding that the encounter was consensual
and, alternatively, if Mr. Coronado was seized by remaining in his vehicle when the officer
activated his emergency lights, that the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion that
Mr. Coronado was engaged in criminal wrongdoing such that his seizure was lawful.
Mr. Coronado contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On the morning of November 24, 2018, Officer Robert Heaton responded to a report of a
vehicle in a residential neighborhood changing parking spots, and the driver sitting in the vehicle
with it running and music playing. (3/8/19 Tr., p.7, L.20 - p.8, L.5.) When Officer Heaton
arrived, he saw the vehicle described by the complaining party parked on the street. (3/8/19
Tr., p.13, L.23 - p.14, L.9.) There was a man inside, speaking on a cellular telephone. (3/8/19
Tr., p.15, Ls.12-22.) Officer Heaton pulled up behind the vehicle and activated his emergency
lights. (3/8/19 Tr., p.14, Ls.21-25.) He approached the parked vehicle and spoke to the person
sitting in the driver's seat, Antonio Coronado.

(3/8/19 Tr., p.14, Ls.13-18, p.18, Ls.14-24;

State's Exhibit 1.) A second officer arrived as Officer Heaton was asking Mr. Coronado for his
license, registration, and insurance.

(State's Exhibit 1; 0:17.)

While he was speaking to

Mr. Coronado, Officer Heaton saw him move an empty Coors Light beer can and thereafter
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initiated a DUI investigation. (3/8/19 Tr., p.19, Ls.2-11.) Officer Heaton asked Mr. Coronado to
participate in field sobriety tests, and Mr. Coronado agreed to perform one test, which he did not
pass.

(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),1 p.3.)

Mr. Coronado refused to

submit to a breath alcohol test. (PSI, p.3.) Officer Heaton obtained a warrant for a blood draw
and the result was 0.207. (3/8/19 Tr., p.25, Ls.10-11; 6/26/19 Tr., p.10, Ls.1-7.) Mr. Coronado
had previously been convicted of two misdemeanor DUis, both in 2018. (6/26/19 Tr., p.10,
Ls.8-22.) Based on these facts, Mr. Coronado was charged by Information with felony DUI,
driving without privileges, and open container. (R., pp.32-37.)
Thereafter, Mr. Coronado moved to suppress the evidence arguing that the officer lacked
any reasonable articulable suspicion to seize Mr. Coronado.

(R., pp.41-42, 44-57.)

Mr. Coronado submitted an affidavit in support of his motion, verifying that he did not feel free
to leave once he saw the emergency overhead lights on the patrol car behind him. (R., pp.54-57.)
The district court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. (See generally, 3/8/19 Tr.)
The district court made the following written factual findings:
1. On November 24, 2018, at around 9:40 a.m., Shirley McCreary called nonemergency dispatch to report a "suspicious" blue pickup truck in her
neighborhood, near Iowa Ave. and Beech St. in Caldwell.
2. Shirley testified that she was smoking a cigarette on her front porch shortly
after 8:00 a.m. when she first noticed the truck parked near the street comer of
her house. The truck was "suspicious" to her because she did not recognize it
from the neighborhood and because the driver - later identified as the
Defendant - was sitting in the truck playing loud music. She testified that the
truck was parked "for a while" and then drove away toward Linden St. She
was still smoking her cigarette when the truck came back and parked across
the street from her house. Shirley finished her cigarette and went inside to tell
her daughter about the truck. Her daughter encouraged her to call police and
report it as a suspicious vehicle.

1

Appellant's use of the designation "PSI" includes the packet of documents grouped with the
electronic copy of the PSI, and the page numbers cited refer to the corresponding page of the
electronic file.
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3. Shirley called dispatch around 9:44 a.m. She reported the suspicious vehicle,
but did not report a crime or other apparent criminal activity. Ofc. Heaton
drove out to the scene. Dispatch advised Ofc. Heaton that the reporting party
saw the vehicle park in several different places, drive around the block, and
then return to park in front of her house, with the vehicle's motor running and
someone sitting in the parked vehicle.
4. Around 10:00 a.m. Ofc. Heaton located the blue truck parked on Iowa Ave.
near the location identified by the reporting party, with one person sitting in
the driver's seat. The officer did not see the Defendant commit any traffic
violations.
5. After he drove past the truck, Ofc. Heaton parked 1-2 car lengths behind it
(facing the same direction) and activated his overhead lights. (State's Ex. 1).
Ofc. Heaton testified that he activated his overhead lights for traffic safety and
to let the driver of the truck know that the officer "was there to talk to him."
6. Ofc. Heaton testified that dispatch often receives suspicious vehicle calls and
that his initial impression of the situation was that the driver was probably lost
or looking for a work site. The officer thought it was likely and innocent
situation and did not necessarily suspect criminal activity. However, he
testified that the circumstances reported to dispatch could be indicative of
criminal activity, like theft or burglary, or of someone needing assistance. He
testified that when he found the "suspicious" vehicle, he wanted to talk to the
driver to discern what was going on.
7. Shirley apparently reported to dispatch that the truck was parked with its
motor running. Ofc. Heaton did not testify about whether or not the truck's
motor was running when he arrived and initiated the encounter. The
circumstances depicted in State's Ex. 1 indicate that the truck's motor was not
running when Ofc. Heaton arrived and initiated the encounter.
8. Ofc. Heaton exited his car and walked up to the truck's driver-side window.
The Defendant was talking on his phone. The officer identified himself and
explained why he was there. Ofc. Heaton asked the Defendant for his driver's
license, registration, and proof of insurance. While he was searching for those
items, Ofc. Heaton saw him place a Coors beer can in the passenger
compartment of the pickup truck. It is readily apparent from State's Ex. 1 that
the Defendant admitted to the officer that his license was suspended and that
he drank a "couple" beers that morning. The officer reasonably suspected
criminal activity and conducted an investigation.

3

(R., pp.76-78.)2 The district court denied Mr. Coronado's motion to suppress. (R., p.86.) The
district court concluded that Mr. Coronado failed to satisfy his burden to show he was seized by
Officer Heaton prior to the discovery of the beer can. (R., p.80.) The court found that because
Officer Heaton was parked 1-2 car lengths away when he activated his overhead lights, and
Mr. Coronado's truck was not running, the encounter was consensual. (R., pp.81-84.) The court
analyzed two Idaho cases in which the officer's emergency lights did not constitute a de facto
seizure, State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482 (2009) and State v. Mireles, 133 Idaho 690 (Ct. App.
1999). (R., pp.82-83.) The court concluded that while the use of the emergency lights is a
significant factor, it is not always determinative and, in this case, it does not overcome the
totality of the circumstances indicating the encounter was consensual. (R., p.84.)
The district court concluded that Mr. Coronado was seized after Officer Heaton saw the
beer can, learned that he drank a couple beers, and had a suspended driver's license. (R., p.78.)
The court concluded that Officer Heaton could lawfully seize Mr. Coronado upon seeing the beer
can, based on reasonable suspicion of DUI, open container, and driving without privileges.
(R., pp.78-79.)
Alternatively, the court held that, even if Mr. Coronado was initially seized, Officer
Heaton had reasonable suspicion to investigate possible criminal activity at the time of the
seizure. (R., p.84.) In so concluding, the district court relied on State v. Fairchild, 429 P.3d 877
(Ct. App. 2018), for the holding that "Citizen calls about suspicious vehicles in residential areas

2

The district court provided these findings of fact in several paragraphs. These findings have
been presented as individually numbered herein for ease of reading.
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may provide reasonable suspicion to briefly seize someone." (R., p.85.) The district court "did
not reach the issue regarding the community caretaking function." 3 (R., p.85.)
Mr. Coronado entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the denial
of his motion to suppress. (6/26/19 Tr., p.3, Ls.8-14; p.8, L.12 - p.10, L.7; R., pp.95, 101, 110.)
The district court sentenced Mr. Coronado to a unified term of five years, with two years fixed,
but placed Mr. Coronado on probation for five years. (R., pp.119-21.) Mr. Coronado filed a
Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Judgment and Commitment and Order of
Probation on Suspended Execution of Judgment. (R, pp.122-25, 132-36.)

3

The community caretaking function is not an exception to the warrant requirement recognized
by the United States Supreme Court, and community caretaking is limited to what is reasonable.
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (holding community caretaking function arises
from the duty of police officers to help citizens in need of assistance, and it is "totally divorced
from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violations of a
criminal statute.") While the United States Supreme Court in Cady limited its brief discussion of
community caretaking to the investigation of vehicle accidents, some courts have expansively
interpreted this to permit officers to generally inquire into the health and safety of drivers, and
even pedestrians. See State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491, 493-94 (1992); State v. Page, 140 Idaho
841, 844 (2004). The Idaho Supreme Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment analysis of
reasonableness should be utilized where the State asserts the officers were acting in a community
caretaking function. Godwin, 121 Idaho at 493-94. Reasonableness is determined by balancing
the public need and interest furthered by the police conduct against the degree and nature of the
intrusion upon the privacy of the citizen. Id. 121 Idaho at 495. Here, Mr. Coronado was parked
and sitting in his vehicle on a residential street around 10:00 a.m. There were no traffic safety
reasons, or any reason to believe he was unwell or in need of assistance. If he was indeed lost, as
the officer suspected, there was no need to pull up behind him with the emergency lights
activated. Instead, Officer Heaton could have simply rolled down his window to ask
Mr. Coronado if he was okay. Thus, the community caretaking function has no applicability
here, and particularly does not excuse the State from the warrant or reasonable articulable
suspicion requirements.
5

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Coronado's motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Coronado's Motion To Suppress Where The
Encounter Was Non-Consensual And Officer Heaton Did Not Have Reasonable Articulable
Suspicion That Mr. Coronado Was Violating Idaho Law At The Time Of The Seizure

A.

Introduction
Mr. Coronado moved the district court to suppress the evidence obtained as the result of

his seizure because the initial encounter between Mr. Coronado and Officer Heaton was not
consensual, and Mr. Coronado was initially seized absent reasonable articulable suspicion of
criminal wrongdoing. On appeal, Mr. Coronado contends that he was seized for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment because a reasonable person parked on the side of a residential street would
not believe that he was free to leave if a police vehicle with its red and blue overhead lights
engaged pulled over directly behind their truck. Mr. Coronado asserts that the district court erred
by concluding that the encounter was consensual and by alternatively concluding that the officer
had reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal conduct when he initiated the stop. This Court
should reverse the order denying Mr. Coronado's motion to suppress.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court's order on a motion to

suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012); see also State v. Hunter, 156 Idaho 568,
571 (Ct. App. 2014) (same). This Court will accept the trial court's findings of fact "unless they
are clearly erroneous." State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418 (2014). "At a suppression hearing, the
power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court." State v. Ellis, 155 Idaho 584, 587 (Ct. App. 2013).
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This Court exercises free review of "the trial court's application of constitutional principles to
the facts found." Danney, 153 Idaho at 408.

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Coronado's Motion To Suppress Where
The Encounter Was Non-Consensual And Officer Heaton Did Not Have Reasonable
Articulable Suspicion That Mr. Coronado Was Violating Idaho Law When He Initiated
The Seizure
"The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from

unreasonable search and seizure." State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003). "Article I,
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution nearly identically guarantees that '[t ]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated."'

State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884, 886 (2015) (alteration in

original). A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable, unless it falls within "one of
several narrowly drawn exceptions." State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706 (2012). The State
bears the burden of demonstrating a warrantless search or seizure falls into an exception to the
warrant requirement. State v. Worthington, 138 Idaho 470, 472 (Ct. App. 2002).
This prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to investigatory
detentions ofa person falling short of arrest, as well as formal arrests. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
30 (1968); State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 651 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho
343, 346 (Ct. App. 1991). Although an arrest of an individual must be based on probable cause,
police may seize a person through an investigatory stop without probable cause, provided there is
a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30; Knapp, 120 Idaho
at 346-47; State v. Cook, 106 Idaho 209, 220 (1984). An investigative detention is permissible if
it is based upon specific articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has
been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.

State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983

(Ct. App. 2003). The purpose of a traffic stop is not permanently fixed at the moment the stop is
8

initiated, however, for during the course of the detention there may evolve susp1c1on of
criminality different from that which initially prompted the stop. State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho
357, 362 (Ct. App. 2000).
"Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and the rational
inferences that can be drawn from those facts." State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 112 (2013)
(quoting State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009)). The State bears the burden of proving that
an investigatory stop or detention is based on reasonable suspicion and is limited in its scope and
duration to the issue being investigated. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). "In order
to satisfy constitutional standards, an investigative stop must be justified by a reasonable
suspicion on the part of the police, based upon specific articulable facts, that the person to be
seized has committed or is about to commit a crime."

State v. Sevy, 129 Idaho 613, 615

(Ct. App. 1997).
In Royer, (plurality opinion), the United States Supreme Court held:
[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely
approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him
if he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if the person
is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution his
voluntary answers to such questions. Nor would the fact that the officer identifies
himself as a police officer, without more, convert the encounter into a seizure
requiring some level of objective justification. The person approached, however,
need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the
questions at all and may go on his way. He may not be detained even
momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal
to listen or answer does not, without more, furnish those grounds.
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. at 497-98 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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1.

The District Court's Finding That Officer Heaton Turned On His Lights For
"Traffic Safety" Is Unsupported By Substantial And Competent Evidence

While the district court concluded that Officer Heaton turned on his overhead emergency
lights for "traffic safety" (R., p.83), the court erred by neglecting to find that Officer Heaton also
testified that he turned on the lights to show Mr. Coronado that he was there and that he wanted
to speak to Mr. Coronado. At the suppression hearing, Officer Heaton was asked why he turned
on his overhead emergency lights. (3/8/19 Tr., p.15, L.1.) He testified "Whenever -- I just
wanted to make sure that they knew I was there to talk to them, you know, and it's also
sometimes there's traffic hazard that you want people to avoid hitting you when you're walking
in the middle of the street. There's a lot of variable reasons to do that but it lets everyone know
we're there and we're there for a reason." (3/8/19 Tr., p.15, Ls.1-8.). When the prosecutor then
asked, "So did you tum on your lights in this case to avoid having a traffic hazard?," Officer
Heaton said "Yes." (3/8/19 Tr., p.15, Ls.9-11.) The district court's finding of fact that the lights
were turned on for "safety purposes" is clearly erroneous and not based upon substantial and
competent evidence where Officer Heaton did not limit his explanation to traffic safety. Factual
findings must be supported by substantial and competent evidence. State v. Henage, 143 Idaho
655, 659 (2007). "Substantial evidence is 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion."' State v. Green, 149 Idaho 706, 708 (Ct. App.
2010) (quoting State v. Byington, 132 Idaho 589, 593 (1999)).

2.

Mr. Coronado Was Seized Where Officer Heaton Projected A Show Of Authority
By Activating His Overhead Lights With His Patrol Car Behind Mr. Coronado's
Truck, To Which Mr. Coronado Acquiesced

A seizure occurs when officers detain someone through physical force or show of
authority. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843 (2004 ). "A seizure initiated through a show of
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authority requires words or actions, or both, by a law enforcement officer that would convey to a
reasonable person that the officer was ordering him or her to restrict his or her
movement." State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 486 (2009) (citing California v. Hodari D., 499
U.S. 621 (1991)). A seizure occurs "when an officer, by means of physical force or show of
authority, restrains the liberty of a citizen." State v. Liechty, 152 Idaho 163, 167 (Ct. App. 2011).
The Liechty Court identified some circumstances that may indicate seizure-whether the officer
used overhead emergency light and whether the officer blocked a vehicle's exit-in addition to:
"Examples of circumstances that might indicate seizure, even where the person
did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the
display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the
citizen, or the use oflanguage or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the
officer's request might be compelled."
Id. at 168 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). So long as law
enforcement "does not convey a message that compliance with their requests is required, the
encounter is deemed consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required." State v. Randle, 152
Idaho 860, 862 (Ct. App. 2012). However, an individual is not seized unless the individual
actually submits to the officer's show of authority. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626-29; Willoughby,
147 Idaho at 486. Therefore, in determining whether an individual was seized for purposes of
the Fourth Amendment, the reviewing court examines:

(1) whether the officer's show of

authority was such that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave; and (2) whether the
individual submitted to that show of authority. See Willoughby, 14 7 Idaho at 486.
Idaho appellate courts have concluded that an individual in a parked car can be seized
either by physical force or a show of authority to which the individual submits. For example, the
Court of Appeals held a seizure occurred when an officer knocked on the driver's side window
of the defendant's vehicle and, after the defendant rolled his window down, asked what he was
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doing and for his driver's license. State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 103 (Ct. App. 1991). The Court
of Appeals found it significant that another officer was directly behind the defendant's vehicle,
so the defendant could not drive away without running over the officer. Id. In Fry, the Court
also found significant the fact that, when initiating contact with the defendant, the officer did not
ask for the defendant's cooperation in answering questions-the inquiry was "what Fry was
doing [which] did not give Fry the option of answering or not." Id. Along the same lines, in
State v. Cardenas, 143 Idaho 903 (Ct. App. 2006), the Court of Appeals held the defendant was

seized when an officer commanded the defendant that "he needed to come speak to me." 143
Idaho at 905, 908. In Cardenas, two officers went to a house looking for a juvenile runaway. Id.
at 905. The officers saw the defendant sitting in a parked car in the driveway. Id. As an officer
approached, the defendant exited the car and walked towards the house. Id.

The Court of

Appeals determined the officer's "inherently coercive" command to speak with him rendered the
contact non-consensual and thus a seizure. Id. at 908.
In Willoughby, the Court ultimately held that the defendant's actions of remaining at the
scene and stepping from the car as the officer approached constituted submission to the officers'
show of authority. 147 Idaho at 488. In reaching this holding, the Willoughby Court analyzed
the holdings of state courts in other jurisdictions to determine whether passive acquiescence to an
ambiguous show of authority constitutes submission such that a seizure occurred. 14 7 Idaho at
488-89.

The Court concluded that inaction is a form of compliance and a submission to

authority. Id. 147 Idaho at 489. In support of its analysis, the Court looked at two cases-one
from Pennsylvania and a Maryland case. In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Krisko, 884 A.2d
296, 300-01 (2005), the court held that the activation of the overhead lights in response to a car
already pulled off the road does not always indicate compulsory detention of the driver, but it is a
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strong indication of a seizure where the driver has no reason to believe that the officer is simply
rendering aid to the stationary vehicle.

In Lawson v. State, the Maryland Court of Special

Appeals concluded, "[flew, if any, reasonable citizens, while parked, would simply drive away
and assume that the police, in turning on the emergency flashers, would be communicating
something other than for them to remain."

707 A.2d 947, 951 (MD 1998).

The Court in

Willoughby could not conclude whether the encounter was consensual because it did not have
enough information about the locations of the vehicles in the parking lot; the court did not know
where the officer's car was in relation to the defendant's car.
In this case, Officer Heaton testified that he turned on his emergency lights to indicate to
Mr. Coronado that he wanted to talk to him. 4 (3/8/19 Tr., p.15, Ls.1-8.) Officer Heaton drove
past the parked truck, turned around, and came up behind the truck. (3/8/19 Tr., p.14, Ls.2-4.)
He activated his overhead emergency lights and parked his patrol car directly behind
Mr. Coronado's truck. (3/8/19 Tr., p.14, Ls.2-4; State's Exhibit 1.) Officer Heaton, armed and
wearing his police uniform, walked up to Mr. Coronado. (3/8/19 Tr., p.14, L.4; State's Exhibit
1.) He approached the driver's window, saying, "How's it going? Hey, Officer Heaton of the []
police department. We got a call, someone called and was complaining about you sitting out
here, and they were nervous." (State's Exhibit 1, 00:12-00:15.) Officer Heaton did not ask for
Mr. Coronado's cooperation, or give him the option of not answering.
Yet, after analyzing the totality of the circumstances, the district court concluded that
Officer Heaton's initial contact with Mr. Coronado was a consensual encounter. (R., p.84.) The
4

At the suppression hearing, Officer Heaton testified that he turned on his emergency overhead
lights "to make sure that they knew I was there to talk to them, you know, and it's also
sometimes there's traffic hazard that you want people to avoid hitting you when you're walking
in the middle of the street. There's a lot of variable reasons to do that but it lets everyone know
we're there and we're there for a reason." (3/8/19 Tr., p.15, Ls.1-8.)
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district court found, "The Defendant's truck was not blocked in or physically prevented from
leaving." (R., p.83.) The district court found that Officer Heaton "did not exhibit any other
behavior in that moment that was so intimidating or coercive as to indicate an order or thereat."
(R., p.83.) However, the district court's finding that Officer Heaton's actions did not constitute a
"show of authority" was clearly erroneous.

The district court erred where the flashing

emergency lights on Officer Heaton's patrol car, and the position of the patrol car-parked
directly behind Mr. Coronado's truck-constituted a "display of authority" such that a
reasonable person would not feel that they were free to leave. The purpose of overhead lights, in
conjunction with a police car pulled behind the vehicle, is to indicate that the vehicle must
remain stopped-the driver is no longer free to leave.
The district court erred where law enforcement clearly "convey[ ed] a message that
compliance with their requests was required;" therefore, the encounter was not consensual. See

Randle, 152 Idaho at 862.

"The critical question is whether, taking into account all of the

circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would have communicated to a
reasonable person that he or she was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his
or her business." State v. Robertson, 134 Idaho 180, 184 (Ct. App. 2000). The activation of
emergency overhead lights on a patrol car, and the officer's actions in pulling directly behind
Mr. Coronado's truck, certainly are not ambiguous-they are a definite show of authority.
The district court determined that Mr. Coronado's engine was not running when the
patrol car lights were activated behind Mr. Coronado. (R., pp.82-83.) The district court found
this fact significant reasoning that the use of emergency lights does constitute a de facto seizure
when the lights are used to signal to a "driver" or "operator" in "actual physical control" of a
motor vehicle. (R., p.82.) The court concluded that a person sitting in the driver's seat of a
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parked vehicle with the engine off is not an operator or driver, and thus, presumably could not be
guilty of violating LC. §§ 49-625 and -1404 should they choose to end the encounter by driving
away.

(R., pp.82-83.)

However, the relevant test is whether the circumstances would

communicate to a reasonable person that they were not free to leave and end the encounter. The
driver is detained because he cannot drive away without violating Idaho law (LC. §§ 49-625, 491404), thus, whether the engine is turned off or the vehicle is running at the time is not
determinative of a detention. It was unlawful for Mr. Coronado to drive away once the officer
pulled up behind him and activated his overhead lights. LC. §§ 49-625, 49-1404. The district
court's reasoning is flawed.
Further, had Mr. Coronado driven away upon seeing the emergency lights from the police
car parked behind him, as well as the uniformed and armed police officer approaching his truck,
he would have been violating Idaho law. See LC. §§ 49-625 (requiring "[u]pon the immediate
approach of. . . police vehicle making use of an audible or visible signal ... the driver of every
other vehicle shall yield the right-of-way and immediately drive to ... the nearest edge or curb
on the right side of the highway and clear of any intersection, and stop and remain in that
position until the authorized emergency or police vehicle has passed .... ), 49-1404 ("Any driver
of a motor vehicle who wilfully flees or attempts to elude a pursuing police vehicle when given a
visual or audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor ... It is
sufficient proof that a reasonable person knew or should have known that the visual or audible
signal given by a peace officer was intended to bring the pursued vehicle to a stop."),
In Willoughby, the Idaho Supreme Court examined both LC. §§ 49-625 and 49-1404 and
concluded that, while neither statute applied because Mr. Willoughby was not driving the car and
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he had not yet tried to leave despite the emergency lights of the patrol car parked near him, the
analysis did not end there:
Our decision turns on the question whether the officers' use of overhead
emergency lights in close proximity to a parked vehicle constitutes a show of
authority "that would convey to a reasonable person that the officer was ordering
him or her to restrict his or her movement." Maland, 140 Idaho at 820, 103 P.3d
at 433. 5 Although we do not hold that a law enforcement officer's action of
turning on his vehicle's overhead lights creates a defacto seizure commanding the
driver to remain stopped pursuant to LC. §§ 49-625 and 49-1404, the use of
overhead lights is a significant factor a court must consider when considering the
totality of the circumstances.
Id. 147 Idaho at 487.

The Mireless Court also considered the illegality of the driver simply driving away from
the emergency lights on the patrol vehicle parked behind him:
Here by contrast, Hulse's act of turning on the overhead lights, although not
necessarily intended to create a detention, did constitute a technical, de facto
detention commanding Mireles to remain stopped pursuant to LC. § 49-625. A
person is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if, in view of all
the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed he or she was no
longer free to leave. State v. Waldie, 126 Idaho 864, 866, 893 P.2d 811, 813 (Ct.
App. 1995). Once Hulse activated the police car's emergency lights, Mireles,
assuming he was cognizant of the fact, was not free to drive away. See LC. § 491404 (prohibiting fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer when signaled to
stop by the officer's emergency lights and/or siren). Thus, the district court
erroneously concluded that Mireles had not been detained.
State v. Mireles, 133 Idaho 690, 692 (Ct. App. 1999); cf State v. Pick, 124 Idaho 601 (Ct. App.

1993) (holding motorist was under no obligation to stop when the officer activated his amber
lights, as these lights are not the emergency lights described in LC. §§ 49-625 and -1404).
The Idaho Court of Appeals has also considered whether a driver's failure to acquiesce to
an officer's use of emergency lights could give rise to criminal implications:
This use of the emergency lights was indicative of a continued detention. See
LC.§ 49-625 (requiring that drivers stop upon the approach of a police vehicle
using emergency lights and remain stopped until the police vehicle has passed or
5

State v. Maland, 140 Idaho 817 (2004).
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the driver has been otherwise directed by a police officer); LC. § 49-1404(1)
(prohibiting a driver from fleeing or attempting to elude a police vehicle when
given a signal to stop by use of the police officer's emergency lights); State v.
Mireles, 133 Idaho 690, 692, 991 P.2d 878, 880 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding act of
turning on overhead lights, although not necessarily intended to create a
detention, constituted a de facto detention commanding the driver to remain
stopped); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436-37, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3148-49,
82 L.Ed.2d 317, 332-33 (1984) (noting that "few motorists would feel free either
to disobey a directive to pull over or to leave the scene of a traffic stop without
being told they might do so.")
State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 651 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding officer's continued questioning
of driver after purpose of traffic stop had ended was not a consensual encounter where officer
began unrelated questioning without turning off the overhead lights on his patrol car and did not
tell the driver he was free to leave).
The district court found that the emergency lights also served a non-law enforcement
purpose in this case: traffic safety. (R., p.83.) However, the facts of this case are distinguishable
from other cases in which the emergency lights were used for traffic safety-here, there was no
danger to either Mr. Coronado or the officers at the scene where the stop happened on a quiet
residential street without traffic. (See State's Exhibit 1.) In Mireless, the position of defendant's
car was a safety hazard because it was parked partially in the roadway.

Here, the risks are

identical to those attendant to an ordinary traffic stop. In fact, the video clearly shows a quiet
residential street-no traffic drove by during the encounter. (State's Exhibit 1.) The street was
wide enough to accommodate both officers' vehicles and presence. (State's Exhibit 1.) Both
officers walked freely around the street. (State's Exhibit 1.) Thus, the district court's reliance on
the emergency lights for traffic safety purposes was unfounded.
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3.

Officer Heaton Did Not Have Reasonable Articulable Suspicion Of Criminal
Wrongdoing When He Activated His Overhead Lights And Pulled Behind
Mr. Coronado

"When a defendant moves to exclude evidence on the grounds that it was obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, the government carries the burden of proving that the search
or seizure in question was reasonable." Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811.

In addition, even brief

detentions of individuals must meet the Fourth Amendment's requirement ofreasonableness. Id.
This means that the detention must be both justified at its inception and reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances that originally justified the interference in the first place. Id.
The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is always "the reasonableness in all the
circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security." Terry,
392 U.S. at 19.

Reasonableness hinges "on a balance between the public interest and the

individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers." United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).

The United States Supreme Court has stated that a seizure under the Fourth Amendment
"must be based on specific, objective facts indicating that society's legitimate interests require
the seizure of the particular individual, or that seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan
embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers." Brown v. Texas,
443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979) (emphasis added). The Brown Court went on to note "we have required
the officers to have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is
involved in criminal activity." Id. Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable
facts considered with objective and reasonable inferences that form a basis for particularized
suspicion. State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983-84 (Ct. App. 2003). Particularized suspicion
consists of two elements: (1) the determination must be based on a totality of the circumstances,
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and (2) the determination must yield a particularized suspicion that the particular individual
being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
"An officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or her possession, and those
inferences may be drawn from the officer's experience and law enforcement training." State v.

Swindle, 148 Idaho 61, 64 (Ct. App. 2009). However, the officer "must be able to articulate
more than an 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion' or 'hunch' of criminal activity."

Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-124 (2000) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S.
1, 7 (1989)).

The United States Supreme Court has cautioned that "[t]he scheme of the Fourth

Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those
charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a
judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the
particular circumstances."

Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.

The officer's conduct must be evaluated

against an objective standard: "would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the
seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was
appropriate?"' Id. 392 U.S. at 21-22. When objectively evaluating the basis for suspecting the
particular person of criminal activity, "the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is
'innocent' or 'guilty,' but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal
acts." Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10.
In this case, the district court alternatively concluded that, even if Mr. Coronado was
seized at the time of the stop, Officer Heaton had reasonable suspicion to investigate possible
criminal activity at the time of the seizure. (R., p.84.) The district court relied on State v.

Fairchild, 429 P.3d 877 (Ct. App. 2018), for that Court's holding that "Citizen calls about

19

susp1c1ous vehicles in residential areas may provide reasonable susp1c1on to briefly seize
someone." (R., p.85.)
However, the district court erred by relying on Fairchild, because the facts of that case
are quite inapposite from the facts of Mr. Coronado's case. In Fairchild, the reporting party saw
two vehicles pull up very quickly onto a paved, dead-end road, parked, and then the drivers sat in
one of the cars for at least ten minutes. Id. 429 P.3d at 883. En route to the location, the officer
ran the license plates of the two vehicle, one of which returned to a person whom the officer
knew was a drug user. Id. When the officer arrived, the two vehicles hastily left the area
traveling in opposite directions, one of which journeyed through an unpaved dirt field. Id. The
Fairchild Court thus concluded, "Together, these specific articulable facts and the rational
inference that the officer drew from the facts-that the drivers of the vehicles had just committed
or were attempting to commit a drug crime-rise to the level ofreasonable suspicion." Id.
These facts are distinguishable from Mr. Coronado's case because in Fairchild, the
criminal wrongdoing was particularized-the totality of the circumstances all led the officer to
believe a drug transaction was occurring. Fairchild, 429 P.3d at 883. As the Idaho Supreme
Court recently said in State v. Gonzales, "'the relevant inquiry' concerning the inferences and
conclusions a court draws "is not whether particular conduct is 'innocent' or 'guilty,' but the
degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts."" 165 Idaho 667, _ ,
450 P.3d 315, 321-22 (2019) (quoting Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10). Here, there has not been any
particular criminal activity suspected-Mr. Coronado could have simply been lost.

He was

playing his music loudly and was parking his truck at various locations around the neighborhood.
(Tr., p.6, L.18 - p.7, L.25.) Officer Heaton testified that he initially thought the driver was
probably lost or looking for a work site, although the circumstances reported to dispatch could be
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indicative of criminal activity, like theft or burglary, or of someone needing assistance.
(R., p. 77); however, this was an unparticularized hunch, at best.
The totality of the circumstances known to Officer Heaton does not give nse to
reasonable suspicion for his warrantless seizure of Mr. Coronado. The facts relied upon by the
district court to support a reasonable suspicion determination were that, when he arrived, Officer
Heaton was able to verify material aspects of the reporting party's report including: ( 1) a blue
pickup truck, (2) parked in the area, (3) with one person sitting in the driver's seat. (R., p.85.)
These facts, taken independently or together, do not give rise to a reasonable articulable
suspicion of criminal conduct. Mr. Coronado's presence in his parked blue truck in a residential
neighborhood does not indicate that he had any involvement in, or even knowledge of, criminal
activity.
"The Supreme Court has previously held that otherwise innocent acts, when considered
together, can be sufficiently suspicious so as to justify an investigative detention." See State v.
Kelley, 160 Idaho 761, 764 (Ct. App. 2016) (citing Sako/ow, 490 U.S. at 9-10). But here, the
totality of the circumstances are not "sufficiently suspicious" to create a reasonable, articulable
suspicion of any criminal activity specific to Mr. Coronado.

A seizure is not justified by

reasonable suspicion that something is going on. That is nothing more than "mere hunch or
'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion"' on the part of the police officer. Bishop, 146 Idaho at
811 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)); State v. Cerino, 141 Idaho 736, 738
(Ct. App. 2005)).
Recently, in State v. Bly, the Court of Appeals held that there was no reasonable
suspicion for a detention where the police officer "articulated no basis justifying why" the
defendant's conduct was "consistent with criminal activity."
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159 Idaho 708, 711 (Ct. App.

2016). The Court of Appeals noted that the officer must be able to articulate something more
than "a hunch based on proximity" or just "strange and suspicious" behavior to support a
reasonable inference that the defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime. Id.
Similar to Bly, Officer Heaton's testimony provides no insight into the criminal activity he
believed Mr. Coronado committed or was about to commit in the parked vehicle. In fact, Officer
Heaton said that citizen reports of unusual vehicles in a neighborhood are "occasionally [ ] how
burglars are caught," he did not testify that he believed Mr. Coronado might be preparing to
burglarize a house. (3/8/19 Tr., p.16, Ls.2-18.) In fact, he testified that he initially thought
Mr. Coronado's presence in the neighborhood "was nothing." (3/8/19 Tr., p.16, L.23 - p.17,
L.1.)

Officer Heaton "did not articulate any basis to support a reasonable inference that

[Mr. Coronado] had either committed, or was about to commit, a crime." Bly, 159 Idaho at 711.
The detention was based on pure speculation.
Ultimately, the facts show Officer Heaton was acting on nothing more than an
unparticularized suspicion or mere hunch of some vague and undefined criminal activity. This is
insufficient to justify a warrantless seizure.

Lacking reasonable suspicion, Officer Heaton's

warrantless detention of Mr. Coronado violated the Fourth Amendment.

The district court

therefore erred in its alternative holding that Officer Heaton had reasonable suspicion to detain
Mr. Coronado due to the "suspicious" behavior of parking his vehicle in various locations around
a neighborhood.
The district court erred in denying Mr. Coronado's motion to suppress evidence where
the encounter was not consensual and Officer Heaton did not have reasonable, articulable
suspicion that Mr. Coronado was engaged in or about to engage in criminal wrongdoing. The
discovery of the evidence used against Mr. Coronado was the product of his unlawful seizure and
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should have been suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." See Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 478-488 (1963). Therefore, Mr. Coronado asserts that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Coronado respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order of
judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress.
DATED this 25 th day of February, 2020.
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